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Abstract
The article investigates reaction-type information operations that can be used for misrepresentation, concealment or
suppression of an information event in society and reviews an approach to their identification.
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Problem statement
Russian aggression in Ukraine exposed an important
problem of being unprepared to oppose the Kremlin in
the information realm. Media attacks can do even more
harm to the country’s defense than military operations
by influencing public consciousness. They may be used
to aggravate fear, cause panic or, on the contrary, to
reassure and control the population. These operations
usually target internal audience and aim to maintain
the government’s authority and preserve the illusion of
stability. Not enough attention is paid to these informa-
tion operations and approaches to their identification.
This paper focuses on these types of operations as, in
order to defeat an enemy, one must understand his
methods and approaches that may in turn reveal his
weaknesses. The aim of the article is to develop an
approach to studying information operations for event
concealment using intelligent analysis of unstructured
text data.
Previous research
Most of the current research on specialized informa-
tion operations in cyberspace aims to develop methods
for timely identification of and counteraction against in-
formation attacks. The most common methods include
search for recurrent patterns in previous attacks, identi-
fication of dependencies and use of acquired knowledge
for the detection and neutralization of similar attacks at
initial stages. Analysis is chiefly conducted to identify
and protect against attacks that openly aim to exert
negative influence on public attitudes and directly affect
the national defense capability. Generally, a specialized
information operation means a series of planned actions
aimed at hostile, friendly or neutral groups of people
with a view to inclining them to make decisions and
take actions that would be beneficial for the subject of
information influence [1]. The word «planned» should
be emphasized in this respect since less scientific atten-
tion has been paid to the identification of spontaneous
information operations that took place in response to
an event.
Summary of core material
The development of approaches to intelligent text
and data analysis as well as systems built on these ap-
proaches have become an effective tool for studying and
identifying previously unavailable, non-trivial, practi-
cally useful and interpretable knowledge necessary for
decision making in different domains of human activ-
ity. It is specialized systems of intelligent analysis of
unstructured Internet text flows that are used for the
identification of information operations. The current
state of technical development allows automating this
process almost completely using machine learning meth-
ods. However, the variety of approaches to specialized
information operations may cause type I and type II
errors. That is why such systems should be used under
constant supervision of experts in this field for better
identification of and timely reaction to a specialized
information operation. These systems must in turn
satisfy certain requirements. The major ones include
speed of information collection from different sources
and comprehensive coverage. Textual information on a
given topic may appear very quickly in very different
sources. These may be web resources, social networks,
TV, press, and radio. Modern search engines are not
capable of covering all sources, and indexation may
take a long time in the case of web resources and social
networks[2]. That is why large regional Internet news
outlets are most often indexed for the users to see in-
formation that is most relevant to their queries. The
existing approaches to the identification of specialized
operations in cyberspace can be conditionally divided
into two types:
1) Classical. Essence of the method: the number of
negative tone messages within equal time spans is
determined [3]. If their number exceeds a threshold
value, it is concluded that an information operation
is taking place. The main advantage of this method
is the ability to detect the operation while it is
in progress. However, this method has plenty of
shortcomings. Typically, there are difficulties in
performing Natural Language Processing (NLP)
of Slavic languages. Therefore, the complex task
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Fig. 1. dynamics of the number of messages on a given
topic. It coincides with the dynamics of the information
operation lifecycle
of determining a document’s emotion in general
and emotions of entities within it becomes even
more complex. Information flows of text arrays
with positive or negative topics may also be part of
an information operation, so the determination of
a threshold value based on expert evaluation may
be false.
2) Based on temporary dynamics of information flows.
Essence of the method: a graph of change in mes-
sage frequency (number in a unit of time) is plotted
and compared with a set pattern. If they coincide,
a conclusion is made that an information operation
is taking place [2],[3]. This approach has obvious
advantages such as visualization of information
flows which enables their comparison with patterns
of information operations and prediction of action
development dynamics, as well as convenience for
experts.
At the same time, both methods have characteristic
drawbacks — low precision, late detection of operations
and possible expert errors. The approach to the identi-
fication of specialized information operations based on
temporal dynamics uses patterns of typical operations.
The dynamics presented in Figure 1 characterizes an





4) Calm before the attack
5) Attack
Theoretically, if similar dynamics is identified at stage
3 or 4, the attack can be countered or predicted and
a response can be prepared. This model usually suits
and characterizes the cases of web resource monitoring
and analysis [4]. In most cases, however, attacks have
a more complicated nature, distribution by types of
sources, stages and speed of progression.
There are other types of information operations in
cyberspace that suggest a reaction to an unexpected
event, so they obviously do not have the preparation
stage. They are conducted as promptly as possible.
Their aim, just like in the case of prepared operations,
is manipulation of collective consciousness. They may
be used both as a rapid attack and as quick defense.
The trigger of this operation is usually a newsworthy
event that must be presented to the audience (soci-
ety) in such a light that it will be beneficial for the
subject of manipulation. There are numerous exam-
ples of such information attacks in the context of war
against Russia. Sometimes they are so grotesque that
the failed propaganda is mocked at. Such operations
include stories about the «crucified boy» or the story
about the skirmish by Sloviansk hyped up by LifeNews,
the Russian propaganda machine: after an armed en-
counter a business card of Dmytro Yarosh, the leader
of the Pravyi Sector, was allegedly found at the scene
as well as the following items: machine gun (German,
dating back to World War II), night vision device, maps,
American dollars and weapons [5]. However, one should
keep in mind that the Russian propaganda aims to si-
multaneously influence both the Ukrainian and Russian
populations. Such actions on the part of the Russian
state mass media in the context of information war are
intended to stir up hatred and maintain the degree of
hostility towards Ukraine. When information needs to
be concealed for the manipulation of public opinion,
the Kremlin mass media effectively diverts attention
to other topics. Suppression means concealment of
selected topics and information related to them. A
much more frequent method is partial coverage and
differentiated presentation of material. It is the way
of information presentation that is the main tool to
frame content in a way that is advantageous for the
manipulator. For example, the situation with dead
troopers from Pskov in Eastern Ukraine in summer
2014. Federal mass media did not mention this informa-
tion on their websites, front pages or in TV programs.
Liberal mass media were forced to remove news and
photos of burial sites. Military men guarded these sites
to prevent photographing and information leakage [6].
Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office of Russia officially
acknowledged that the circumstances of death of Pskov
troopers are a state secret. It follows from the official
reply that the troopers did not die at the permanent
station of their military units. Criminal proceedings
must be initiated automatically following servicemen’s
death unless it was an accident[6].
However, no cases were opened in this respect, rel-
atives received compensation and the situation was
not publicly disclosed. The information operation was
successful. A definitive factor of its success was that
people were ready for this development; an algorithm
was created for military men and media representatives
in case of such situations.
Another thing is when an unpredicted force majeure
situation is taking place that shall not be made public.
The spread of information must be suppressed as soon
as possible. It is quite simple in case of traditional
mass media: total ignoring of information or categori-
cal denial of any facts, labeling of foreign publications
highlighting the event as fake news. However, it is
much more difficult to prevent the spreading of infor-
mation in the web and in social networks. The subject
of manipulation adopts various approaches in order to
solve this problem. They include simultaneous artifi-
cial development and promotion of other topics using
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controllable mass media and corrupt opinion leaders in
social networks in order to divert attention from the
main event. This approach may shift the focus of atten-
tion, but it cannot prevent the diffusion of unwanted
information. Unexpectedly, a propagandist manipula-
tor can take advantage of the algorithms of web sources
indexation by present-day web search engines. Several
search systems can be considered for the Russian In-
ternet segment. The leaders include Google with 49%
of users, Yandex with 46% and Mail.ru with 2.5% [7].
The others can be disregarded as very few people use
them for searching information. It is inappropriate to
run the analysis with respect to Yandex and Mail.ru
since they are loyal to the Russian government and can
display search results in a biased fashion. So we will
focus our attention on the mechanism of the Google
indexation tool. Google web crawler has a User Agent
— Googlebot, which is the main crawler for scanning
pages and adding them to the search index. Addition-
ally, there are several other crawlers for the indexation
of images, mobile apps, and ad profiles. Google uses
the PageRank ranking algorithm [8]. This algorithm is
one of the key factors for the ranking of sites in search
results. The essence of the method is as follows: the
more links to pages the more important the site is and
the higher it is ranked in search results. Google search
engine attempts to solve the problem of relevance —
the ability of information displayed in search results
to satisfy the user’s needs (queries). It takes into ac-
count users’ personal data to generate only those results
that they need. This process also has shortcomings:
for example, if a user always goes to a certain set of
websites, search results will display these websites at
the top even if there are more relevant pages on other
resources. Assuming that someone criticizes Ukraine in
social networks, a search query about the public opinion
in Ukraine will only generate results with a negative
presentation of events. Generally, whatever the query,
the user will get information that does not contradict
his/her opinion. This algorithm execution shapes an
impression in the user’s mind that an absolute majority
of the population share his/her opinion, so it rejects
the possibility of unbiased event coverage. It should be
noted that it is now possible to turn off the personalized
search feature in Google, but this function is as rarely
used as users go to the second or third page of search
results. Therefore, in order to block information flow
to users, the manipulator’s objective is to fill the search
engine with information that will be relevant or similar
to the user’s query about the event but will redirect to
websites with absolutely different topics.
As an example of reaction-type specialized informa-
tion operation, let us consider one of the key events of
the war in Syria that is still in progress, namely the
battle of Khasham that took place at night on 8 Febru-
ary (when the forces of the Wagner Group that also
took part in the war in Donbass were defeated), and the
reaction of the mass media to this event. During the
armed clash, the U.S. military carried out an air strike
destroying Russian and Assad’s armored task force [9].
The strike was carried out in response to the attempt of
the Russian and Assad’s troops to use the cover of dark-
ness to set off to the Conoco natural gas factory near
Khasham, where Syrian-Kurdish democratic forces were
stationed and the headquarters of American counsellors
was situated. On 7 February 2018 at 10 p.m. local
time, two battalion task groups each consisting of three
companies of Wagner Group contractors disguised as
Syrian soldiers formed a marched column and went to
the Conoco gas field near the town of Al Tabiyeh. The
attack at Kurdish and American positions was carried
out from the base on the left bank of the Euphrates
previously seized by the Russians (approximately 80
km south-west from Deir ez-Zor in the territory which,
as was agreed by the parties, was supposed to remain
under the control of Kurdish military formations). A
preparation fire preceded the attack. The Russian head-
quarters traditionally replied to the propositions of the
American party to stop moving towards American and
Kurdish position at the stage of deployment of Russian
forces that there was «nothing happening» at their end
and «they were not there». The counterattack of the
U.S. artillery and air force lasted for more than 7 hours.
The American high-precision missile artillery was the
first to attack the Russian column, followed by military
air forces. Both Wagner battalions were crushed as a
result of the battle. Company 5 was destroyed almost
completely[9]. A Russian artillery support group, lo-
gistic base and the Russian-Syrian headquarters deep
in Assad’s territory that was controlling the attack at
Kurdish positions were also annihilated. The battle was
over at 5:30 a.m. 8 February 2018. The official head-
quarters of the Russian command in Syria requested
an armistice from Kurds and Americans over the radio
in order to evacuate the dead and the injured from the
battlefield. The Russian side did not provide any offi-
cial data or information on casualties. On 15 February,
a week after the event, Maria Zakharova (Director of
the Information and Press Department of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation) informed
that 5 Russian citizens that were not Russian service-
men might have died in the battle. She called messages
about hundreds of dead Russians «false information»
[10]. In the material dated 15 February, Reuters an-
nounced data on Russian casualties — around 80 – 100
people died, and another 200 were injured [11],[12].
It is worth analyzing what was happening in the
Russian Internet mass media with regard to this event.
Semantrum analytical system for intelligent analysis of
unstructured text flows was used for this purpose. The
Semantrum system was developed at the LIGA infor-
mation company (promo.semantrum.net). It collects,
processes and generalizes news from over 14 thousand
domestic and foreign web sources. The Semantrum sys-
tem is designed to find relevant topic-based news in the
Internet, promptly generate search results, grant users
access to online information search on multiple web-
sites, perform semantic processing and, consequently,
minimize users’ effort to filter out duplicate information
and information noise. Thus, if an average Russian
citizen read in social networks or heard about the con-
frontation of Wagner Group contractors and American
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Fig. 2. General dynamics of messages as a result of
«wagner» query in Russian Internet publications
forces in Syria, he/she want to find information about
this event using a search engine in order to disprove or
confirm this information. Queries may be quite differ-
ent, but they will all have the head word «wagner» in
common. Examples of such search queries may include
the following Russian phrases:
• вагнер (wagner)
• чвк вагнер (chvk wagner)
• вагнер сирия (wagner syria)
• вагнер сша (wagner usa)
• вагнер америка россия (wagner america russia)
• противостояние вагнер сша (opposition wagner
usa)
• что произошло с вагнер (what happened to wag-
ner)
• and others
In order to block these information requests and pre-
vent the user from accessing information related to
the military conflict per se, Russian Kremlin Internet
mass media had to unwind a completely different topic
with similar key words in major sources. Using the
Semantrum analytical system, 5568 documents were
identified in Russian Internet publications dated be-
tween 01 and 28 February 2018 based on the general
«вагнер» («wagner») query. The general dynamics is
presented in Figure 2.
We are especially interested in the period of most fre-
quent publications from 12 to 16 February and will not
consider the subsequent fading information background
of the following days. Though the military conflict
took place on 8 February, related information started
appearing in the Internet several days later. It was a
weekend. Internet news outlets typically reduce the
number of publications on days off. It should be noted
that the subject was first brought up on Sunday 11
February in Ukrainian sources. This day was probably
used by the Russian system to prepare the reaction of
information protection. On Monday 12 February, the
Russian media segment started developing a topic that
would overlap with the users’ queries and redirect to
completely different information. Thus, on Monday a
large number of publications were issued concerning
the exaggerated conflict between the American figure
skater Ashley Wagner and the Russian figure skater
Alina Zagitova. The dynamics of these publications is
shown in Figure 3. The publications often included the
following phrases and sentences:
• Wagner vs Zagitova: the American attacks the
Russian star
• Critical statements of the American figure skater
Ashley Wagner against Russian Alina Zagitova was
the subject of hot discussions in the net
Fig. 3. Dynamics of messages concerning the figure
skater Wagner in Russian Internet publications
Fig. 4. Dynamics of messages concerning the military
conflict in the publications of large Russian Internet
sources
• The Federation of Figure Skating of Russia (FFSR)
explained Ashley Wagner’s criticism towards Alina
Zagitova by the fact that the American cannot
skate as well as the 15-year-old Russian
The use of sentences with key words that are cognate
with queries concerning the military conflict cause re-
spective pages to be indexed as such that match both
queries. Extra weight to this pages is added by the use
of words «Wagner», «America», «Russia», «conflict»,
«attack» next to each other in the text.
Before midday 12 February, a considerable number
of articles were published in large news outlets in order
to block the display of information in response to the
«wagner» query. Large Internet news outlets basically
ignored the topic of military conflict. The dynamics of
messages concerning PMC (private military company)
Wagner in the publications of large-scale news outlets
is shown in Figure 4.
Naturally, Ukrainian Internet news outlets completely
ignored the topic of exaggerated conflict between fig-
ure skaters. Publications appeared only in knowingly
pro-Russian Komsomolskaya Pravda in Ukraine and ru-
informer.com online media outlet, which is recognized as
Ukrainian since it is situated in the Crimea. There were
no anomalous peaks in English-language publications
either. Although the famous American is mentioned
there, the topic was only brought up in the English
versions of the Russian propaganda outlets such as Rus-
sia Today and Lifenews. Thus, if the abovementioned
average Russian citizen quickly searched the Internet,
he/she would first see references to publications that
have nothing to do with the military conflict. The spe-
cialized information operation in cyberspace was suc-
cessful. The dynamics shown in Figure 5 characterizes
the model of the reactional information operation.
At stage 0, an event takes place, and information
about it begins spreading in the Internet mass media.
Shortly, at stage 1, the subject of manipulation decides
on the suppression of the information wave and the
commencement of a reaction-type information operation
— spreading of a parallel topic that is relevant to the
main query. At stage 2, the dynamics of diffusion of the
distractor topic becomes more intensive or comparable
to the main one at its peak. It is the main period of
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Fig. 5. Dynamics of event coverage and reaction of
suppression
the topic propagation lifecycle when the manipulation
target’s attention is diverted. It is followed by gradual
fading to complete silence.
Conclusion
The paper analyzes the existing approaches to the
identification of specialized information operations in
cyberspace. An emphasis is put on the fact that modern
research does not pay enough attention to operations
that are reactions to an event. They are used by the
manipulator to conceal events and divert the attention
of the manipulation target, i.e. society.
An approach is examined and a model is proposed
to identify such operations using cutting-edge systems
for the content analysis of unstructured text documents
in the Internet using temporal series of relevant publi-
cations, their subsequent analysis and filtering for the
identification of anomalous surges.
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